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Abstract: In 2012, the Government decided on the prepara-
tion of the first national programme of measures – an Action 
Plan – for the prevention of violent extremism. Now the Plan 
has been revised. In accordance with international best practic-
es the prevention of violent radicalisation refers to the specific 
measures focused on those groups and individuals who run 
the risk of becoming radicalised. The updated Plan continues 
the actions which are still relevant and which proved effective 
in the first programme. The Action Plan has been updated by 
including measures which meet the new challenges of the 
operating environment as well as changes therein. The Plan was 
prepared through extensive participation between the authori-
ties, organisations and communities. The Ministry of the Interior 
steers and coordinates the implementation of the Action Plan; 
different authorities, organisations and communities contribute 
to the effort.
The core content and the goals of the Action Plan are as follows:
1. Coordinate prevention, disseminate best practices, 
increase competency and act flexibly by taking into 
account the changes in the operating environment. The 
aim is to make the action coherent, without unnecessary 
duplication or gaps. Competency and best practices 
must be easily available. The action must be developed 
and reviewed according to the changes in the operating 
environment. 
2. Create effective and viable structures and measures for 
the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. 
The objective is to ensure that the wherewithal and per-
manent structures for preventing violent radicalisation 
and extremism at the level required by the local situation 
picture are in place everywhere in Finland.
3. Launch the RADINET (exit) service. The goal is to de-
velop a service which supports the disengagement of 
radicalised persons from violence and from the sphere 
of influence of violent groups. At the same time this will 
reduce the threat of violence to society and people.
4. Launch the Helpline service to support the family and 
friends of the radicalised people. The goal is to support 
them in situations where a family member or friend has, or 
is about to, become radicalised. This will help prevent the 
social exclusion of the family and contain radicalisation.
5. Promote the actions of organisations in developing servic-
es to which radicalised extremists can be referred. The goal 
is for the organisations to establish violence-prevention 
services everywhere in Finland which facilitate disengage-
ment from violence, ideologically motivated violence 
included. The authorities, especially the police, are aware of 
said services, and case management and service coordina-
tion function in an efficient and comprehensive manner.
6. Increase competency, expertise and awareness as 
regards the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism. The goal is for both professionals and the rep-
resentatives of organisations who, in their everyday work, 
encounter people that have, or are about to, become 
radicalised to be able to widely recognise the underlying 
signs of radicalisation and properly act in order to put 
an end to the development that leads to radicalisation. 
Expand research on violent radicalisation and extremism.
7. Efficiently detect and investigate hate crime, support the 
victims and the target communities of hate crime. The 
police and the other law enforcement authorities will 
improve their action on detecting and investigating hate 
crime: the objective is to reduce the underlying causes of 
violent radicalisation and extremism.
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8. Actions resulting from the increased number of asylum 
seekers. The growing number of asylum seekers has 
exacerbated polarisation in society, which different 
extremist movements try to exploit in their efforts 
to recruit more supporters and to disseminate vio-
lence-inducing propaganda. The objective is to prevent 
the dissemination of violent radical propaganda and 
recruitment to violent extremist movements among 
asylum seekers, and to efficiently carry out integration. 
The action will take into account the recommendations 
of the report ‘The educational tracks and integration 
of immigrants – problematic areas and proposals for 
actions’ (Publications of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, Finland 2016:6).
9. Prevent violent radicalisation and extremism through 
good, balanced and clear communications. The goal 
is to use words, in writing and in speech, in a manner 
that does not offend, label or radicalise any individuals 
or groups as supporters of violent extremism or, at the 
extreme, as terrorists.
10. Strengthen the ability of children and adolescents to 
identify and guard against violence-inducing messages 
and propaganda. The objective is for children and adoles-
cents, on their own and together with others, to counter 
radical and extremist messages and propaganda. 
11. The particular responsibility of the police in the preven-
tion of violent radicalisation and extremism. The objec-
tive for the police is to be comprehensively cognisant of 
their special responsibility in preventing and countering 
violent radicalisation and extremism. This responsibility 
stems from the fact that violent extremism, as a phe-
nomenon, lies at the core of maintaining public order 
and security: guaranteeing a safe living environment 
and the safety of individuals and communities as well as 
protecting civil rights.
12. Measures aimed against different forms of violent radi-
calisation and extremism.
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9Introduction
Violent extremism refers to using, threatening with, encouraging 
or justifying violence based on one’s own view of the world or 
on ideological grounds. Violent radicalisation is an individual 
process which may result in a person joining violent extremist 
groups or action. At its most extreme violent radicalisation can 
result in terrorist acts. The prevention of extremist violence is 
important for social harmony as well as the sense of safety and 
security among communities and individuals alike. Increased 
visibility of violent extremism in society may not only result in an 
increase of the direct threat of violence, it may also intimidate 
people into not invoking their constitutional rights, such as the 
freedom of speech and expression or the freedom of movement.
The significance of preventing violent radicalisation and 
extremism has been increasing since the early 2000s. It is now 
more clearly understood that detecting, countering or inves-
tigating violent or terrorist crimes no longer suffices. Rather, 
prevention is also needed. The phenomena and threats associ-
ated with extremist violence are fluid and rapidly evolving. On 
6 January 2016 the United Nations (UN) published the Secre-
tary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. The 
key goal of the Plan of Action is for the Member States to draft 
their own national plans of action. In 2014 the European Union 
adopted the guidelines for combating radicalisation to terror-
ism and violent extremism1  – a revision of the EU Strategy for 
Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism adopted 
in 2005. Previously this Strategy was updated in November 2008. 
The Council of Europe is also engaging in efforts to counter 
violent radicalisation and extremism. In January 2015 the Nordic 
countries signed a Cooperation Agreement of the Nordic net-
work to prevent extremism. Finland is an active participant in the 
international prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism.
All said, the international efforts will fall short of the goal un-
less violent radicalisation and extremism is effectively countered 
at the national and local level. Being that the threat is global, 
it demands robust national and local input. In addition to the 
police, also teachers, social workers, healthcare professionals, 
youth workers along with organisations and communities are 
at the core of the action. Families and adolescents are of central 
importance in preventing violent radicalisation and extremism.
In 2012 the Government decided on the preparation of  
the first national Action Plan for the prevention of violent 
extremism.2 Now the Plan has been revised. The updated Plan 
continues the actions which are still relevant and which proved 
effective in the first programme. The Action Plan has been up-
dated by including measures that meet the new challenges of 
the operating environment as well as changes therein. The Plan 
was prepared through extensive participation between the au-
thorities, organisations and communities. Three workshops were 
organised in the summer of 2015, to which a wide range of 
actors were invited. Using the material developed during these 
sessions the National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of 
Violent Extremism prepared the current Action Plan. While the 
Plan was being prepared, it was presented to the representa-
tives of, among others, cities, Muslim communities and different 
authorities with the aim of receiving their comments already at 
the draft phase. The Action Plan takes into account the evalua-
tions and recommendations obtained from the representatives 
of the European Union regarding the work carried out in Finland 
and international best practices. An example of this is the visit 
of an expert team of the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness Network 
Centre of Excellence in Finland in June 2015. In accordance with 
international best practices the prevention of violent extremism 
refers to specific measures focused on groups and individuals 
which run the risk of becoming radicalised.
Nationally, the Ministry of the Interior coordinates the 
prevention of violent extremism. The other authorities remain 
responsible for actions and development within their purview, 
pursuant to the Government Rules of Procedure. Municipalities, 
organisations and communities participate in the implemen-
tation of the Action Plan in accordance with the principles of 
cooperation. All actors share the same goal: a safe and pleasant 
Finland in the future as well – a country whose inhabitants share 
the sense of belonging and participate in the development of 
society through non-violent means. 
1 Guidelines for the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and  
Recruitment to Terrorism 2014
2 Towards a Cohesive Society – Action Plan to Prevent Violent  
Extremism, Ministry of the Interior publications 33/2012.
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The key content and the objectives of the Action Plan’s 
measures are the following:
1. Coordinate prevention, disseminate best practices, in-
crease competency and act flexibly by taking into account 
the changes in the operating environment. The aim is to 
make the action coherent, without unnecessary duplica-
tion or gaps. Competency and best practices must be eas-
ily available. The action must be developed and reviewed 
according to the changes in the operating environment.
2. Create effective and viable structures and measures for the 
prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. The 
objective is to ensure that the wherewithal and permanent 
structures for preventing violent radicalisation and extrem-
ism at the level required by the local situation picture are in 
place everywhere in Finland.
3. Launch the RADINET (exit) service. The goal is to develop a 
service which supports the disengagement of radicalised 
persons from violence and from the sphere of influence of 
violent groups. Simultaneously, this will reduce the threat 
of violence to society and people. 
4. Launch the Helpline service to support the family and 
friends of the radicalised people. The goal is to support 
them in situations where a family member or friend has, or 
is about to, become radicalised. This will help prevent the 
social exclusion of the family and contain radicalisation. 
5. Promote the actions of organisations in developing ser-
vices to which violently radicalised people can be referred. 
The goal is for the organisations to establish violence-pre-
vention services everywhere in Finland which facilitate 
disengagement from violence, ideologically motivated 
violence included. The authorities, especially the police, are 
aware of said services, and case management and service 
coordination function in an efficient and comprehensive 
manner. 
6. Increase competency, expertise and awareness as regards 
the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation. 
The goal is for both professionals and the representatives 
of organisations who, in their everyday work, encounter 
people that have, or are about to, become radicalised to 
be able to widely recognise the underlying signs of radi-
calisation and properly act in order to put an end to the 
development that leads to radicalisation. Expand research 
on violent radicalisation and extremism. 
7. Efficiently detect and investigate hate crime, support the 
victims and the target communities of hate crime. The 
police and the other law enforcement authorities will 
improve their action on detecting and investigating hate 
crime: the objective is to reduce the underlying causes of 
violent radicalisation and extremism.
8. Actions resulting from the increased number of asylum 
seekers. The growing number of asylum seekers has exac-
erbated polarisation in society, which different extremist 
movements try to exploit in their efforts to recruit more 
supporters and to disseminate violence-inducing prop-
aganda. The objective is to prevent the dissemination of 
violent radical propaganda and recruitment to violent 
extremist movements among asylum seekers, and to 
efficiently carry out integration. The action will take into 
account the recommendations of the report ‘The educa-
tional tracks and integration of immigrants – problematic 
areas and proposals for actions’ (Publications of the Minis-
try of Education and Culture, Finland 2016:6).
9. Prevent violent radicalisation and extremism through 
good, balanced and clear communications. The goal is to 
use words, in writing and in speech, in a manner that does 
not offend, label or radicalise any individuals or groups 
as supporters of violent extremism or, at the extreme, as 
terrorists.
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10. Strengthen the ability of children and adolescents to iden-
tify, and guard against, violence-inducing messages and 
propaganda. The objective is for children and adolescents, 
on their own and together with others, to counter radical 
and extremist messages and propaganda. 
11. The particular responsibility of the police in the prevention 
of violent radicalisation and extremism. The objective 
for the police is to be comprehensively cognisant of their 
special responsibility in preventing and countering violent 
radicalisation and extremism. This responsibility stems 
from the fact that violent extremism, as a phenomenon, 
lies at the core of maintaining public order and security: 
guaranteeing a safe living environment and the safety of 
individuals and communities as well as protecting civil 
rights.
12. Measures aimed against different forms of violent radical-
isation and extremism. The objective is to be able to more 
efficiently prevent right-wing extremist recruitment, in-
crease the competency and the preparedness of the police 
in countering left-wing extremist violence, which especially 
occurs during demonstrations, to reduce the number of 
those travelling to conflict areas, and to establish a process 
for dealing with those returning from said areas.
International cooperation, in which Finland actively partici-
pates, supports the national and local efforts to prevent violent 
radicalisation and extremism. The international cooperation 
which takes place among the Nordic countries, in the European 
Union and with third countries helps develop strategies and 
policies for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism, it 
also makes it possible to compare the lessons learned and best 
practices, expand knowledge on different methods, participate 
in research cooperation and anticipate future developments.
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1.1 What does violent radicalisation and extremism  
  mean?
For the purposes of this Action Plan violent extremism refers 
to using, threatening with, encouraging or justifying violence 
on ideological grounds. Violent extremism is not a criminal law 
concept. Extremist violence is not necessarily revolutionary, and 
it often targets a group or individuals denoted as the enemy. It 
raises fear and insecurity locally, such as in individual city dis-
tricts or communities, and it can also target personal property. 
Aggravated criminal mischief against a reception centre can be 
mentioned as an example of this. Crimes motivated by hate or 
racism can also be categorised as extremist crimes.
Violent radicalisation is a process through which individuals 
resort to violence or the threat thereof, urge someone to com-
mit acts of violence or justify it on ideological grounds. There 
are always several underlying causes behind radicalisation, and 
radicalised persons do not fit any uniform profile. The factors 
that result in radicalisation are associated with individuals, their 
life situations and society. One of the most important factors 
involves the sense of social exclusion, discrimination and racism. 
Still, while problems in livelihood and marginalisation can foster 
radicalisation, they alone cannot explain it. Situational factors 
have a great effect on why some individuals become radicalised 
and others do not.
In this Action Plan ideology means the kind of shared 
worldview that stems from attitudes about groups of peo-
ple, the world, religion, relations between people and states, 
human dignity, what is sacred and what is profane as well as 
corresponding beliefs that constitute a moral compass for an 
individual.
Whereas terrorism is always violent extremism, all extremist 
violence is not terrorism. Terrorist crimes are specified in the 
Criminal Code. Terrorist violence is insurgent, targeting states 
and international organisations. The ambition of terrorism is to 
extensively cause panic among the general public.
1 The grounds for and the principles of preventing violent 
radicalisation and extremism in Finland
1.2 Why do violent radicalisation and extremism  
  constitute significant threats?
It is always important to prevent crime, disturbances and acci-
dents as well as influence their underlying causes. It is particu-
larly important to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism 
because their effects rise above those of individual acts.
The prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is im-
portant for the sake of safety, the sense of security of individuals 
and society, and for social harmony. The effect of ideologically 
motivated violence is more detrimental to the sense of security 
and social harmony than the immediate effects of the acts of vi-
olence themselves. In addition to the actual victims of violence, 
and the family and friends, the threat targets the population 
groups that they represent. The fear created by the threat may 
intimidate people into not invoking their constitutional rights, 
such as the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of 
religion or the freedom of movement. Then, in reality, extremist 
violence is also an attack against the democratic system. Violent 
extremism exacerbates tensions among different groups of the 
population and may even result in social destabilisation.
It is possible to reduce the threat of terrorism and massacres 
by preventing violent extremism. It is important to bring the 
perpetrators of serious crime to justice. In recent years, Finland 
has reviewed its legislation associated with terrorist crimes and 
the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. Nevertheless, 
according to studies, the penal system and the fear of punish-
ment fail to reduce violence. This is especially true of ideologi-
cally motivated violence because in its extreme forms even the 
perpetrator’s own demise does not act as a deterrent to the 
act. Examples of such action are suicide attacks and massacres 
where the perpetrators end up killing themselves. Practice has 
also shown that prospective jail sentences rarely manage to 
disengage individuals from violent ideals or ideologies. On the 
contrary, recent examples have shown that jail sentences may 
even galvanise radicalisation.
13
It is both legally and economically unviable to extensively 
monitor people who are ideologically committed to violence. 
Therefore, it is necessary to try to influence society in a way that 
that would sway individuals from joining such groups.
The prevention of violence is profitable. The annual price tag of 
violence in Finland amounts to approximately EUR 850 million. 
The costs arising from extremist violence have been calculated in 
Sweden3. According to them, a single person participating in vi-
olent extremist action for a period of 10–15 years incurs the total 
cost of SEK 6–30 million to society. A violent right-wing extremist 
group of 15–20 members incurs the total cost of approximately 
SEK 290 million to society during a period of 15 years.
Extremist violence is self-propagating. It encourages simi-
lar-minded groups to resort to violence, and provokes other 
violent extremist movements into counter-strikes. The increase 
of extremist violence often generates a vicious circle of violence 
which is extremely difficult to break being that the different 
parties spur each other on to violent behaviour.
The Ministry of the Interior regularly publishes a Situation 
Overview which evaluates the developments, threats and 
relevant factors of violent extremism. The overall threat has both 
evolved and grown in Finland. One of the threats associated 
with extremist violence involves the conflict in Syria and Iraq 
and the resultant significant increase in the number of asylum 
seekers, which has exacerbated polarisation among the popula-
tion. Since 2012 more than 70 persons4 identified by the author-
ities have travelled to the combat zones in Syria and Iraq. Most 
of them are estimated to have joined terrorist organisations.
The violent far right has become more active. This develop-
ment has been the catalyst for the rapid increase in the number 
of asylum seekers in the autumn of 2015. As a result, the violent 
right-wing movement has stepped up its activities, seeking 
to increase its support among the population. Astoundingly 
violent hate speech has become more prevalent, targeting a 
wide range of individuals and groups. Violent right-wing groups 
may cause local problems in terms of racist crime because they 
especially target ethnic minorities and anti-fascists. The violent 
far left is often energised during demonstrations. Recently, 
disturbances have been witnessed, especially at nuclear power 
plant construction sites. Still, the ‘lone wolves’ who justify their 
violence on the basis of various motives pose the greatest dan-
ger. It is difficult to anticipate or expose their action. 
1.3 The principles of preventing violent  
  radicalisation and extremism
The prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism in Fin-
land is based on the following principles and policies:
 The prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism will 
target individuals and groups. Many factors influence the 
extent of violent extremism in society. Shortcomings 
or problems in social policy areas such as upbringing, 
education, equality, wellbeing, livelihood and social 
participation, and weak social cohesion provide growth 
potential for violent radicalisation and extremism. The 
prevention of violent extremism refers to the specific 
measures focused on those groups and individuals which 
run the risk of becoming, or are already, radicalised. There-
fore, this Action Plan does not consider matters that 
fall under social policy and which significantly affect 
violent extremism in Finland as prevention of extremist 
violence. When it comes to social discourse, the goal of 
preventing violent extremism is to disseminate infor-
mation on the phenomenon itself and on such social 
structures that are the breeding ground for it.
 The primary goal of prevention is to reduce violence against 
people, and the threat of it. Regarding individuals, the 
objective is to persuade the person to renounce the use 
and threat of ideologically motivated violence, or the 
3 Nilsson & Lundmark-Nilsson (2013): Sammanfattning av intoleransens 
pris, and Nilsson & Lundmark-Nilsson (2012): Vänd dem inte ryggen 
4 Situation in the autumn of 2015.
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encouragement to use it, or to thwart any development 
which would otherwise result in such behaviour. When 
it comes to groups the goal of influencing is to prevent 
violently radicalised groups from forming, and to bol-
ster their indigenous capability to counter violence-in-
ducing propaganda and recruitment. 
 Prevention will target all forms of violent extremism in 
Finland. These include the violent far right, the violent 
far left and the violence used by radicalised alternative 
social movements, religiously motivated extremist 
violence as well as individual actors.
 Participation and transparency, clear coordination. 
According to experiences from home and abroad, 
the effective prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism necessitates wide-ranging cooperation and 
clear coordination. The prevention of violent extrem-
ism will occur under the wide umbrella of local and 
national cooperation, which includes the authorities, 
organisations, religious communities and the business 
community. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible 
for the national coordination of prevention. In accord-
ance with the Government Rules of Procedure, the 
Ministry, and its Police Department, remain responsi-
ble for matters regarding order and security in public 
places. Violent extremism, as a phenomenon, relates 
to the core of maintaining public order and security: 
guaranteeing a safe living environment and the safety 
of individuals and communities as well as protecting 
civil rights. The other administrative branches are 
responsible for prevention in their respective sectors. 
Municipalities play an important role in preventing 
violent radicalisation and extremism because they 
are responsible for providing services that promote 
wellbeing and participation for their inhabitants. Or-
ganisations work at the grass roots level by taking into 
consideration people’s situations in a comprehensive 
manner. This being the case, the organisations’ services 
are elemental to the prevention of violent radicalisation 
and extremism. Religious communities can strengthen 
people’s participation, social interaction and spiritual 
life. They can mutually support each other and take 
action if religion is being hijacked as a justification for 
violence.
 Action that counters violent radicalisation and extremism 
as well as the promotion of democracy and human rights 
are mutually supportive. Violent extremism results in 
the violation of many human rights, such as the right 
to life, freedom of movement, freedom of speech 
and religion, and the right to adequate housing and 
shelter. It is particularly detrimental to the rights of the 
most vulnerable groups of people, for instance girls in 
ethnic minorities. The materialisation of human rights 
as well as transparent and good governance and a 
non-discriminating society which sustains participation 
eradicate the grounds for resorting to violence.
 Interaction, both vertically and horizontally between 
different authorities, organisations and communities. The 
prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism 
demands up-to-date situational awareness as well 
as various means through which the radicalisation 
process among individuals and groups can be halted. 
It is only possible through regular interaction between 
individuals and organisations to amass all-encom-
passing information to support prevention. No single 
authority or organisation possesses the means to put 
a stop to the radicalisation process among individuals 
or groups on its own. When the different practitioners 
collaborate, they also gain access to a wider range of 
instruments.  
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 An implementing organisation based on networking and 
networks. Situations and challenges associated with vio-
lent radicalisation and extremism are fluid and rapidly 
evolving. Considering prevention, it is of the essence 
to be able to react and act fast. Networking and a net-
work-based implementing organisation facilitate fast 
and flexible reaction in local and national work.
 Effective and clear communications constitute an element 
of prevention. Communications are key to the preven-
tion of violent radicalisation and extremism. Violent ex-
tremist movements are adept in using the social media 
and other communications in recruitment and the dis-
semination of violent propaganda. The actors that are 
responsible for prevention can use communications as 
an important instrument in prevention. Lackadaisical or 
ill-considered communications or obliviousness about 
terms and concepts can strengthen radicalisation.
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The national short-term (the end of 2018) goals for preventing 
violent radicalisation and extremism are as follows:
1. National and local structures and procedures based 
on multi-professional cooperation are in place which 
makes it possible for the authorities, organisations 
and communities to prevent violent radicalisation and 
extremism.
2. The volume of ideologically motivated crime will con-
tinue to decrease year by year.
3. The number of those travelling to conflict areas for the 
purpose of engaging in combat/violence will start to 
go down from its peak, 1 November 2015.
4. Those returning from conflict areas are identified and 
the ones having committed crimes will be brought to 
justice. All returning persons will be systematically tar-
geted with individually tailored measures which reduce 
the risk of violence and help improve their ability to 
cope.
5. The police will efficiently detect and investigate hate 
crimes. The victims of hate crime will be supported and 
the impacts of crime on the victim’s reference group 
will be identified.
2 Finland’s goals for preventing  
violent radicalisation and extremism
The national long-term (the end of 2025) goals for prevent-
ing violent radicalisation and extremism are as follows:
6. The number of people who feel personally or collec-
tively threatened by violent extremist movements 
diminishes. 
7. Young people refuse to join violent extremist move-
ments or groups. Influencing society and deci-
sion-making through legal means is felt to be effective 
and rewarding.
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The field in which violent radicalisation and extremism is being 
prevented is wide, and a number of actors possess responsibil-
ities, competency and resources for this purpose. The following 
describes the duties of certain key actors and their capacity to 
prevent violent radicalisation and extremism.
Politicians and decision-makers direct and steer the different 
sectors of social policy and provide guidelines for them. From 
the standpoint of preventing violent radicalisation and extrem-
ism, the key policy sectors include education, social and health 
services, employment, and integration and housing. Successful 
policies in these sectors curb the breeding ground for violent 
radicalisation and extremism. Speech is yet another important 
instrument for decision-makers. Speech and rhetoric can either 
help reduce violent radicalisation and extremism and strength-
en participation in society or increase the risk of radicalisation 
and give the signal that some of those who are here do not 
really belong here. 
Social services can identify a variety of warning signs as-
sociated with radicalisation and refer people to the required 
services. An important function of social services is to evaluate 
the need for special support such as benefits for employment, 
education and livelihood. These can be make-or-break elements 
from the perspective of the radicalisation process. Social servic-
es are responsible for child protection measures which are taken 
into use when all other means offered to the family no longer 
suffice. Child protection measures can be employed when the 
person who runs the risk of becoming radicalised or is already 
radicalised is under 18 years of age or has underage children. 
When it comes to the safety and wellbeing of children, violent 
radicalisation and extremism is a significant risk to their wellbe-
ing and safe development.
Healthcare services can impact the radicalisation process 
through maternity and child health clinic services as well as 
school and student healthcare services or by guiding the 
persons to other services which help them disengage from vio-
lence. The healthcare services can access both public and third 
sector services which offer special assistance for disengaging 
from violence. Even if violent radicalisation and extremism are 
not mental illnesses per se, international research and expe-
3 Different actors and their duties in 
preventing violent radicalisation and extremism
riences indicate that there is a strong correlation with mental 
health problems. This being the case, mental health services 
play an important role in the prevention of violent radicalisation 
and extremism. From the healthcare services’ perspective the 
goal is to look after the health and wellbeing of these individ-
uals, and to pre-empt any actions which could put their life in 
jeopardy or endanger the family and friends, and other people.
Youth services encounter many adolescents and they can 
early on identify the young people who are attracted to violent 
extremism and movements. Youth services can also notice 
changes occurring in adolescents and intervene in their devel-
opment through positive means. Outreach youth work can also 
come across young people who are about to fall into the sphere 
of violent extremist ideologies and movements. Youth services 
can carry out actions which strengthen the adolescents’ involve-
ment, media literacy and their ability to counter violence-induc-
ing propaganda.
The education sector plays a key role in preventing violent 
radicalisation and extremism. While teachers do notice various 
signs of radicalisation in adolescents, they do not always distin-
guish how the behaviour or various problems may be associ-
ated with and make them vulnerable to radicalisation. When it 
comes to the safety and security processes at schools and other 
educational institutions, it is also important to steer the oper-
ating culture towards pupil participation and wellbeing. Pupil 
and student welfare services along with case management and 
service coordination are also important means for breaking the 
radicalisation process. Teachers are professionals in education 
and, as a part of the teaching process, they are able to improve 
pupils’ media literacy skills and discernment and thereby in-
crease their understanding on how to influence decision-mak-
ing in society through non-violent means.
The police are important in preventing violent radicalisation 
and extremism. In their everyday duties the police come across 
persons who are about to become radicalised, are already 
radicalised or are committing crimes motivated by violent 
extremism. The multi-professional early intervention model 
(Anchor model) operating at police departments targets radi-
calised persons. The Anchor model is supported by cooperation 
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groups which more extensively plan and implement measures 
that prevent violent extremism. Among other things, the police 
can use methods such as interviews and criminal investigation 
instruments, and refer people onwards to services provided by 
organisations and the other authorities.
The Finnish Security Intelligence Service monitors the develop-
ment of violent radicalisation and extremism and the situation 
picture. The exchange of information between the local police 
and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is important when 
it comes to compiling national and local situation pictures. The 
Finnish Security Intelligence Service monitors international 
developments, identifies new threats and provides expert assis-
tance to the other authorities.
Organisations provide vital services that are key to the 
prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. It is often 
the case that those interested in extremist violence and the 
members of such groups place little trust in the authorities. 
Therefore, it is often easier for them to turn to services provid-
ed by organisations. Organisations have services which help 
people disengage from violence, they also offer mentoring and 
other similar services which make it easier to renounce ideals 
that condone the use of violence. Furthermore, organisations 
also provide an avenue for non-violent social activism. 
Religious communities are experts and credible actors in 
matters related to religious interpretation. Religious commu-
nities can support individuals and groups that counter the 
recruitment of violent factions. They also play an important role 
in strengthening the communities’ resistance to violence-induc-
ing propaganda. Working together, religious communities can 
act against violence and spread the message that violence can 
never be justified on the basis of religion.
The family and friends are in a good position to prevent rad-
icalisation. In spite of this, radicalisation can occur without the 
family being aware of it. Violent extremist groups often demand 
that their members sever all ties to people outside the group, 
family and friends included. Their goal is to make the individual 
totally dependent, both physically and mentally, on the violent 
group. This is how families can lose their members. Still, because 
emotional ties are often strong, they make a potent force in 
preventing individuals from joining violent extremist action. The 
family needs support, advice and spiritual counselling in order 
to prevent its members from joining a violent extremist group. 
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The party that carries the main responsibility for the given 
measure is indicated by bolded text.
4.1 Coordinate prevention, disseminate best  
  practices, increase competency and act flexibly  
  by taking into account changes in the operating 
  environment
OBJECTIVE: The aim is to make the action coherent, without un-
necessary duplication or gaps. Competency and best practices are 
easily available. The action is developed and reviewed according to 
the changes in the operating environment.
1. The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention 
of Violent Extremism will be reinstated for another 
term. It reports to the Ministry of the Interior and its 
composition reflects the priorities and focus areas of 
action (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior).
 According to international experiences the effective 
prevention of extremist violence necessitates clear co-
ordination and wide-ranging cooperation. The Ministry 
of the Interior is responsible for the national coordi-
nation. The composition of the National Cooperation 
Network will take into account the actors that carry key 
responsibilities in preventing violent extremism. These 
include the administrative branches associated with 
upbringing and education, the security of educational 
institutions and their students, the health and social 
wellbeing of people as well as criminal policy. The most 
important organisations from the perspective of action 
are also represented in the Network.    
 The activities of the National Cooperation Network are 
also supported by a network to which actors are invit-
ed on the basis of topical themes and regional empha-
ses. The functional themes are determined annually in 
the National Cooperation Network’s operating plan.
 The National Cooperation Network coordinates and 
promotes the nationwide action for preventing violent 
radicalisation and extremism. Other important duties 
4 The measures to prevent 
violent radicalisation and extremism
of the Network are, among other things, preparing the 
training arrangements for the prevention of violent 
radicalisation and extremism, research, drafting the Sit-
uation Overviews, promoting local activities, planning 
the EXIT action and other services, cooperating with 
communities, and communications.
 Create effective and viable structures for the preven-
tion of violent extremism and radicalisation.
OBJECTIVE: The objective is to ensure that the wherewithal and 
permanent structures for preventing violent radicalisation and 
extremism at the level required by the local situation picture are in 
place everywhere in Finland.
2. The intersectoral early intervention model (Anchor mod-
el) operating at police departments prevents violent 
radicalisation and extremism and carries out individual 
early intervention. Organisations and representatives of 
communities are also involved in this activity. (Responsi-
bility: Ministry of the Interior, National Police Board)
 The police have decided to establish the intersectoral 
Anchor model at each police department. In addition 
to the police, representatives of social services as well 
as psychiatric nurses and youth workers, among others, 
operate within the framework of the Anchor model. 
Support and participation from the other authorities is 
needed for the Anchor model to be established.
 The capacity of the Anchor model to prevent violent 
radicalisation and extremism is contingent upon the lo-
cal operating environment and situation picture. There 
are three levels to the model.
 The levels are the following:
 Minimum level. The intersectoral Anchor model operating 
at each police department functions as a point of con-
tact and the responsible party for cases associated with 
violent radicalisation and extremism. The Anchor model 
provides the necessary training to the regional authori-
ties and other actors so as to make certain that they are 
able to contact the appropriate parties from the outset.
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 The minimum level is best suited to small commu-
nities and localities where violent radicalisation and 
extremism occurs at the individual level. However, it is 
important to point out that the risk of violent radical-
isation and extremism does exist even in small local-
ities. School assassins, those that threaten to commit 
massacres and the individuals that became ‘self-rad-
icalised’ over the Internet and travel to conflict areas 
serve as examples of this. For this reason it is important 
to establish extremism-intervention expertise even in 
smaller localities
 Basic level. In addition to the Anchor model a local co-
operation group or the National Cooperation Network 
for the Prevention of Violent Extremism operates in 
the municipality or region. In addition to the organisa-
tions that participate in the Anchor model, the group 
comprises those authorities and actors that participate 
in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extrem-
ism, or which possess special intelligence and expertise 
in it. These are, among others, the education sector, 
the regional office of the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service, organisations working against violence as well 
as victim assistance organisations and crisis support 
services. The task of the cooperation group or network 
is to monitor the development of violent radicalisa-
tion and extremism locally – relying principally on the 
observations of the Anchor model – and to launch 
such actions and initiatives that reduce its threat in the 
region. The cooperation group or network can act as 
an element of already existing municipal security coop-
eration and planning structures, when appropriate.
 The basic level is suitable for cities and localities where 
one or more violent extremist movements or groups 
are active, or where the risk of several different forms of 
violent extremism is evident. The Ministry of the Interior, 
together with the National Police Board, the Finnish 
Security Intelligence Service and the Association of 
Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, will prepare a list 
of the municipalities which should, at minimum, launch 
the model at the basic level. All of the abovementioned 
actors, working together, will systematically support the 
launching of the activity in these municipalities.
 High level. In addition to the basic level functions which 
comprise the intersectoral Anchor model and the 
National Cooperation Network, at high-level locali-
ties there are full-time experts on violent extremism 
working at the police department or the municipality, 
or both. Local needs will determine the focus of the 
experts’ work; it is linked to the Anchor model and/or 
the activities of the local cooperation group.
 The high level is best suited to cities where extremist 
violence poses an elevated threat to everyday security 
and the sense of security. Municipalities and police 
departments, relying on their own situational assess-
ments, will independently determine the extent to 
















Figure 1. Legend: SOS = Social services, POL = Police, Organisations = organisations active in the prevention of 
extremist violence.
 In addition to the authorities, organisations and the 
representatives of communities also participate in local 
action. The police or, if otherwise agreed, the munic-
ipality will invite the representatives of organisations 
and communities into this cooperation.
3. Cooperation among the authorities, organisations and 
communities is carried out in an intensified manner in 
Helsinki, Turku and Tampere. These localities will launch 
the ‘Reach Out’ action establishing a close-knit commu-
nity uniting the authorities, organisations, communities 
and religious actors that work under the umbrella of 
preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. The 
participants will receive intensive support for their 
efforts to curb violent radicalisation and extremism. 
The goal is to make available everyone’s expertise and 
experiences among all participants and to spread the 
word of available services and best practices in the 
region. (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, Finn 
Church Aid (FCA)).
4. Cooperation in the prevention of violent radicalisation 
and extremism will be increased among the cities in 
the capital region and their police departments to 
ensure that a radicalised individual living in the region, 
or one about to become radicalised, will not be left 
without the appropriate support merely because of red 
tape. (Responsibility: National Police Board, the cities 
and Police Departments of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa).
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4.2 Launch the RADINET (exit) service
OBJECTIVE: Develop a service which supports the disengagement 
of radicalised persons from violence and from the sphere of influ-
ence of violent groups. Simultaneously, this will reduce the threat of 
violence to society and people.
5. Launch the Radinet (exit) service. It is systematic action 
targeting the individual and its aim is for the person in 
question to renounce ideologically motivated violence 
or disengage from it. Entering the process is voluntary. 
The objective of the Radinet service is to reduce the 
threat of violence and is a supplement to criminal 
justice instruments. It is impossible to reduce the threat 
of violence posed by violent extremist movements 
or criminal gangs to people and society by tackling 
the problem of violence through a criminal justice 
response alone. In the first phase the action targets 
radicalised religious extremists and in the second 
phase the radicalised supporters of violent right-wing 
groups. Participation in the Radinet service is voluntary. 
The action is coordinated by the Vuolle Settlement, and 
many organisations, supported by religious commu-
nities, participate in organising services. While the 
Radinet service is supported by local grass-roots organ-
isations and representatives of religious communities, 
the steering group also includes the key authorities 
regarding this action. (Responsibility: Vuolle Settle-
ment, organisations, Ministry of the Interior)
6. Prevent radicalisation in prisons. Prisoners are in many 
ways vulnerable and, hence, particularly susceptible to 
the propaganda and recruitment of violent extremist 
groups. Radicalisation in prisons is one of the greatest 
concerns in Europe. In line with the Conclusions of the 
Council of the European Union, Finland commits to 
implement a considered and tailor-made policy to pre-
vent radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent ex-
tremism in prisons, adapted to national circumstances 
and the needs of the individuals involved, which could 
include elements such as: developing risk assessment 
tools and tools to detect early signs of radicalisation; 
training prison staff to recognise radicalisation; offering 
inmates opportunities for learning and developing 
critical thinking skills in prison, etc. The policies of the 
Council for Penological Co-operation (PC-CP) on radi-
calisation and extremist violence, a subordinate body 
to the Council of Europe, and the experiences of the 
Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excel-
lence (RAN) will be taken into account in planning and 
implementing the activities. Finland will also actively 
participate in RAN and in the operation and develop-
ment of the Radinet (exit) network insofar as the action 
concerns remand prisoners (detainees) and sentenced 
prisoners. (Responsibility: Ministry of Justice, Criminal 
Sanctions Agency).
4.3 Launch the Helpline service to support the family  
  and friends of the radicalised people
OBJECTIVE: Support the family and friends of the radicalised peo-
ple in situations where a family member or friend has, or is about to, 
become radicalised. 
7. The families and friends of those who have be-
come radicalised need support. The support can be 
pre-emptive when the individual is only considering 
joining some ideologically based extremist group or 
movement. Likewise, support is also needed when the 
individual has already joined such a group or move-
ment. For example, support can materialise in the form 
of expert counselling and guidance on how to act in a 
given situation and to whom to turn for the required 
services. Support can also be provided to a family 
whose child has departed for a combat area. According 
to preliminary experiences individuals that abandon 
their action in a combat area and return home do so as 
a direct result of family influence. Yet another objective 
of the support is to help the family overcome the crisis. 
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It must be ensured that the other family members 
do not become radicalised because of pressure or 
shame. The organisations are expanding their action 
in supporting families and individuals that suffer from 
radicalisation and violent extremism by launching the 
Helpline action which assists families and friends in 
questions related to radicalisation. The expert assis-
tance and support of the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness 
Network Centre of Excellence (RAN) will be utilised 
when the action is being developed. (Responsibility: 
SOS-Crisis Centre, Ministry of the Interior). 
4.4 Promote the actions of organisations in  
  developing services to which violently  
  radicalised people can be referred
OBJECTIVE: Everywhere in Finland there are organisations that 
have violence-prevention services which facilitate disengagement 
from violence, including ideologically motivated violence. The au-
thorities, especially the police, are aware of these services, and case 
management and service coordination function in an efficient and 
comprehensive manner.
8. Even in spite of the fact that young men are over-rep-
resented among the perpetrators and victims of crime, 
there are only a few anti-violence and disengagement 
services available for young men in particular. Most 
services are provided by organisations. Only a small 
fraction of the young men seek out or are referred 
to these services. We will promote the nationwide 
proliferation of organisation services that support 
disengagement from violence occurring outside the 
home. We will promote the expansion of the scope of 
activities of anti-violence organisations to include the 
prevention of ideologically motivated violence through 
international and domestic training. The awareness 
of the authorities, especially the police, regarding the 
available services will be increased. (Responsibility: Na-
tional Cooperation Network, local cooperation groups, 
organisations, National Police Board).
 Grass-roots organisations are present in people’s 
everyday life. These organisations play an especially 
important role when it comes to preventing travel to 
conflict areas and teaming up with violent right-wing 
gangs. We will support and promote the activities of 
these organisations and their abilities to participate in 
the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. 
Organisations also provide an avenue for non-violent 
social activism. (Responsibility: National Cooperation 
Network, local cooperation groups).
4.5 Increase competency, expertise and awareness  
  as regards the prevention of violent  
  radicalisation and extremism
OBJECTIVE: Professionals and the representatives of organisa-
tions who, in their everyday work, encounter people who have, or 
are about to, become radicalised are able to widely recognise the 
underlying signs of radicalisation and properly act in order to put an 
end to the development that leads to radicalisation.
9. The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention 
of Violent Extremism will annually compile the train-
ing needs upon which a comprehensive training plan 
will be prepared. The plan will also take into account 
the training conducted by various actors. The key 
focus groups for training are the key sectors of action: 
education, youth work, social and health services and 
the police as well as basic and high-level local cooper-
ation groups. (Responsibility: National Cooperation 
Network, local cooperation groups).
10. Promote research which yields information that 
supports the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism. Actively participate in Nordic and interna-
tional research activities, and effectively utilise national 
and international financing sources. (Responsibility: 
researchers, different branches of administration, 
and other actors within their respective sectors)
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11. The National Police Board provides guidance and 
remains responsible for pre-emptive action and the 
systematic training of the Anchor model as regards 
matters associates with violent radicalisation and 
extremism. The Anchor model actors will network with 
each other and disseminate best practices and lessons 
learned. The expertise of the police will be utilised in 
training local networks and other authorities. The An-
chor participants will remain responsible for providing 
training at minimum-level localities. (Responsibility: 
National Police Board, Anchor practitioners).
12. The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention 
of Violent Extremism will organise annual seminars and 
other events which gather the different actors togeth-
er. ‘Tietotalo’ seminars will be continued where tangible 
information on violent extremism is presented to cities 
and authorities alike. (Responsibility: National Cooper-
ation Network).
13. Actively participate in international events and training 
with the objective of obtaining new information and 
disseminating best practices and lessons learned. The 
goal is to evenly provide training among all regional 
and local practitioners while taking into account the 
local level of the threat of violent extremism, and the 
need for training. In addition to the authorities, also 
promote the possibility of organisations, cities and 
communities participating in the training. (Responsibil-
ity: National Cooperation Network).
14. As the focus areas of supplementary training provid-
ed by the Finnish National Board of Education (FNBE) 
and the Regional State Administrative Agencies are 
being determined, increasing the instruments and 
competency in identifying and handling propaganda 
and violent radicalisation and extremism in schools 
and educational institutions will be taken into account. 
(Responsibility: Ministry of Education and Culture, 
FNBE, Regional State Administrative Agencies).
15. In the primary phase the ‘electronic toolbox’ will be 
taken into use. The toolbox, designed for professionals, 
will be further developed to meet the demands of the 
changing operating environment, the focus of activi-
ties and the information needs of the practitioners. The 
toolbox will become an integral element of nationwide 
prevention. (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior).
4.6 Efficiently detect and investigate hate crime,  
  and support the victims and the target  
  communities of hate crime
OBJECTIVE: The police and the other law enforcement authorities 
will improve their action on detecting and investigating hate crime. 
One objective is to reduce the underlying causes of violent radicali-
sation and extremism.
16. Hate speech and hate crime are linked to violent 
radicalisation and extremism. Hate speech can egg on 
those that are particularly vulnerable to commit hate 
crime or to link up with violent extremism. Individuals 
and groups targeted by hate speech and hate crime 
run a high risk of becoming radicalised, especially 
when they feel that society and the authorities do not 
sufficiently intervene and protect their rights. As part 
of their everyday work the police detect and tackle 
suspected hate crimes reported to the police and, 
when required, carry out criminal investigations. The 
Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior will 
prepare a report on how the process of detecting and 
investigating hate crimes should be intensified, and 
what kind of research and data support are needed. 
(Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior).
17. Hate crime has been defined as a crime against a person, 
group, a person’s property, institution, or a representative 
of these, motivated by prejudice or  hostility towards the  
victim’s  real  or  perceived ethnic  or  national  origin,  
religion  or  belief,  sexual  orientation,  gender identity or 
appearance, or disability 5 or some similar characteristic. 
5 “Hate crime reported to the Police in 2011” (in Finnish): Police Univer-
sity College publications. http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-815-243-2
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When it comes to hate crime the individual targeted by 
the crime is not the only victim. Rather, it is the entire 
community the victim represents. If the victim does 
not receive any support, the general willingness to 
report further hate crimes to the police may decrease. 
This, in turn, increases cynicism and the notion that 
hate crimes are not taken sufficiently seriously and that 
the victim will not receive justice. Together with Victim 
Support Finland (VS) the Ministry of the Interior has 
implemented the EU’s ‘Good Practice +’ project which 
creates the practices for supporting the victim of racist 
and hate crime. The best practices created through 
the project, and potential follow-on projects, will be 
implemented. (Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, 
National Police Board, VS)
18. Religious communities and religious premises can also 
become the targets of hate speech and hate crime. 
Finn Church Aid (FCA), working with religious commu-
nities, develops action in which said communities will 
support each other when threatened or faced with a 
concrete danger. The ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ action will 
be further developed and implemented. (Responsibili-
ty: FCA, religious communities).
4.7 Actions resulting from the increased number of  
  asylum seekers
OBJECTIVE: Prevent the dissemination of violent radical propagan-
da and recruitment to violent extremist movements among asylum 
seekers, and efficiently carry out integration. The action will take 
into account the recommendations of the document ‘The educa-
tional tracks and integration of immigrants – problematic areas 
and proposals for actions’ (Publications of the Ministry of Education 
and Culture, Finland 2016:6).
19. Approximately 32,000 asylum seekers arrived in Finland 
in 2015. According to estimates, the number of asylum 
seekers in Europe will remain high for the coming years 
as well unless the root cause of the problem, i.e. wars 
and conflicts around the world, can be resolved. Owing 
to their vulnerable status and uncertain future asylum 
seekers can be particularly susceptible to extremist 
propaganda. Asylum seekers and reception centres are 
also targeted by vandalism and crimes. The aforemen-
tioned facts, coupled with problems in integration as 
well as misgivings and discrimination on behalf of the 
majority population may also increase the risk of indi-
vidual radicalisation. Reception centre staff and others 
working with asylum seekers will be trained to identify 
violent radicalisation and extremism and to prevent it. 
(Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, National Police 
Board).
20. Pursuant to the goals of the Government action plan 
on asylum policy (8 December 2015) Finland will 
effectively promote integration for those who have 
been granted a residence permit, proactively prevent 
feelings of social exclusion among young people and 
ensure safe growth and education paths, particularly 
for unaccompanied minors. The action will take into 
account the recommendations of the document ‘The 
educational tracks and integration of immigrants – 
problematic areas and proposals for actions’ (Publica-
tions of the Ministry of Education and Culture, Finland 
2016:6). (Responsibility: Ministries and authorities 
responsible for integration)
21. The security of all persons and employees involved 
with the integration process will be guaranteed. (Re-
sponsibility: Ministries and authorities responsible 
for integration).
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4.8 Prevent violent radicalisation and extremism  
  through good, balanced and clear  
  communications
OBJECTIVE: Use words, in writing and in speech, in a manner that 
does not offend, label or radicalise any individuals or groups as 
supporters of violent extremism or, at the extreme, as terrorists.
22. Speech and words are important in preventing violent 
radicalisation and extremism. Poorly chosen words and 
expressions may exacerbate radicalisation and height-
en the sense of marginalisation which is often an im-
portant catalyst for violent radicalisation. A glossary for 
‘violent radicalisation and extremism’ will be prepared 
that will encompass the kinds of terms that are positive 
and constructive and whose use will not foment 
radicalisation. (Responsibility: National Cooperation 
Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism).
23. Improve and clarify communications regarding the 
goals and means for preventing violent radicalisation 
and extremism. Attempts will be made to engage in 
dialogue and interaction with different groups with the 
aim of achieving a sense of having shared goals and 
means. Prepare up-to-date material to support com-
munications which increase awareness among those 
working to prevent violent radicalisation and extrem-
ism as regards messages between violent extremist 
groups, the means of dissemination and the focus 
groups of the messages. (Responsibility: National 
Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent 
Extremism). 
24. Further advance the situation overview arrangements 
on violent extremism. The goal is to disseminate  
up-to-date situational information on violent  
extremism in Finland. (Responsibility: National  
Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent 
Extremism).
25. Regularly organise round table discussions with mem-
bers of the media, and when necessary other parties, 
on topical issues regarding violent radicalisation and 
extremism. (Responsibility: National Cooperation 
Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism, 
local cooperation groups).
26. Experiences from different countries have shown that 
when crises associated with violent extremism occur, 
clear, balanced and successful communications are 
of paramount importance to limiting and reducing 
damage. A crisis communications plan will be prepared 
which will describe the principles of communications 
in situations which demand communicating informa-
tion on the phenomena associated with violent radical-
isation and extremism during disruptions, disturbances 
and crises. (Responsibility: National Cooperation 
Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism).
4.9 Strengthen the ability of children and  
  adolescents to identify, and guard against,  
  violence-inducing messages and propaganda
OBJECTIVE: Children and adolescents, on their own and together 
with others, are able to counter radical and extremist messages and 
propaganda.
27. Children and adolescents, on their own and together 
with others, are able to counter radical and extremist 
messages and propaganda. Media literacy is a key skill 
which bolsters the ability of children and adolescents 
to counter propaganda and the ‘alternative media’ 
which has proliferated in recent years. In the general 
objectives of the core curricula for pre-primary and 
basic education, approved in 2014, and the objectives 
of the national core curriculum for upper second-
ary schools, approved in 2015, media literacy, as an 
element of across-the-board competency, is included 
in the multi-literacy skill set and in different subjects 
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of basic education in a cross-cutting manner. Further-
more, the new objectives for basic education place 
increasing emphasis on human rights and adjustment 
to the democratic society. In addition to schools also 
youth work, libraries and organisations, among others, 
promote media literacy. (Responsibility: Ministry of 
Education and Culture, Finnish National Board of 
Education, National Audiovisual Institute KAVI).
28. Foreign policy, human rights and encounters with 
human rights violations as well as belittling human 
suffering are important underlying causes of violent 
radicalisation. Violent extremist movements effectively 
exploit these themes in their propaganda, fostering 
feelings of injustice and frustration. This is why many 
an adolescent feels that violent action is an important, 
or the only, means of direct influencing. We must make 
certain that young people have the opportunity to 
engage in open dialogue on topics that are important 
to the prevention of violent radicalisation and extrem-
ism by organising youth-centred debates and other 
events that focus on themes such as foreign policy, 
human rights, etc. (Responsibility: Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice).
29. According to studies Finnish adolescents, young boys 
especially, are extremely biased against ethnic minor-
ities. Prejudice, and the associated fear of otherness, 
is often the result of ignorance. Cultural and global 
education will be intensified in schools and during 
leisure activities; opportunities for young people to 
visit different religious communities (e.g. churches, 
mosques, synagogues, etc) will be increased and 
opportunities for engaging in dialogue and interaction 
among different religions will be created. (Responsibili-
ty: educational institutions, youth services, organi-
sations, religious communities).
4.10 The particular responsibility of the police in the 
  prevention of violent radicalisation and  
  extremism
OBJECTIVE: The police are comprehensively cognisant of their 
special responsibility in preventing and countering violent radical-
isation and extremism. This responsibility stems from the fact that 
violent extremism, as a phenomenon, lies at the core of maintaining 
public order and security: guaranteeing a safe living environment 
and the safety of individuals and communities as well as protecting 
civil rights.
30. The prevention of violent radicalisation and extrem-
ism will be included as part of the pre-emptive action 
of the police and the Anchor model, which will be 
expanded. According to the decision of the National 
Police Board all police departments must carry out ac-
tivities as per the Anchor model. The model will include 
the preparedness for preventing violent radicalisation 
and extremism. All police departments will implement 
the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism 
at the minimum, basic or high level. (Responsibility: 
National Police Board).
31. Police presence in the social media is a new and evolv-
ing feature. It is an element of all police work, pre-emp-
tive activities included. Thus far it has not systemati-
cally focused on violent radicalisation and extremism 
because its virtual presence has varied depending on 
the grounds of the police departments’ own capacities 
and focus areas in the social media. The National Police 
Board will further develop the online presence of the 
police and, at the same juncture, determine the con-
tent, goals and tasks of virtual police action with regard 
to preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. 
(Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, National Police 
Board).
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32. The individuals that pose a security risk include those 
with a high potential for violence but are impervious to 
a criminal justice response, or who cannot be commit-
ted to involuntary treatment. In order to manage the 
security threat a focused threat assessment instru-
ment – a screening instrument – is being used at the 
command centres of Helsinki and Oulu Police Depart-
ments, and by nearly all police units. The screening 
instrument has proven viable in practice. It has already 
helped prevent potentially serious acts of violence and 
massacres. The police have established the ‘national 
threats’ function. The goal of concentrating this func-
tion nationally is to further hone the threat evaluation 
processes of the police, the screening instrument itself, 
to participate in international threat evaluation cooper-
ation, to support police units in managing demanding 
and high-risk threats and to act as the national point 
of contact of the police vis-à-vis the other authorities, 
especially the social and healthcare authorities. The 
possibility of an expedited referral of risk individuals to 
specialised healthcare has not materialised as planned. 
There has been no success in establishing a uniform 
national model for case management. The ‘national 
threats’ model will continue developing the introduc-
tion of the screening instrument among the police au-
thorities, the network of healthcare experts specialised 
in danger-level assessment and targeted violence, and 
a national model for referring an individual to a medical 
evaluation. (Responsibility: National Police Board).
4.11 Measures aimed against different forms of  
  violent radicalisation and extremism
Violent far right
OBJECTIVE: Improve the preconditions of preventing recruitment 
to violent right-wing groups.
33. So far the volume of violent far-right activities and the 
number of active members has been quite modest. 
However, recently there have been signs of increased 
activity among different groups. In order to prevent 
their membership from growing it is imperative to 
obtain information on the means of, and the individu-
als targeted by, recruitment. The police will prepare a 
report to support pre-emptive action. (Responsibility: 
Ministry of the Interior, National Police Board, Finnish 
Security Intelligence Service).
Violent far left
OBJECTIVE: Increase the competency and the preparedness of the 
police in countering left-wing extremist violence, which especially 
occurs during demonstrations.
34. The threat of anarchist violence is particularly prevalent 
during demonstrations. In these cases the violence 
also targets the authorities, particularly the police, 
as well as far-right groups and neo-Nazis whom the 
anarchists view as their main adversaries. The police 
will improve their action in countering violence during 
demonstrations. This includes action both before and 
after demonstrations. (Responsibility: National Police 
Board).
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Religiously motivated violent radicalisation and extremism
OBJECTIVE: Reduce the number of those travelling to conflict areas 
and establish processes for dealing with those returning from these 
areas.
35. Per capita, and compared to similar situations in the 
past, quite many people from Finland have travelled to 
conflict areas. Especially in recent times those having 
departed for Syria and Iraq have mainly joined the 
terrorist groups operating in the region. Extensive 
cooperation among the authorities, organisations 
and communities is required to reduce the number 
of people travelling to combat zones. However, it is 
important for one actor – the Anchor model – to be 
able to proceed in a situation when an individual is 
contemplating travelling to combat areas or is about to 
depart. The other actors can always contact the Anchor 
operators when they encounter an individual who is 
about to become radicalised. The Anchor model, and 
its cooperation with other actors, will be strengthened 
as regards preventing travel to conflict areas. (Respon-
sibility: Ministry of the Interior, Finnish Security Intelli-
gence Service, National Police Board).
36. The individuals that departed for the combat zones in 
Syria and Iraq and are about to return pose a serious 
challenge to society. The first item of importance is to 
establish the identities of the people returning from 
the region. Those having committed crimes must be 
brought to justice. Nonetheless, a number of them 
cannot be prosecuted for crimes: either there is not 
sufficient evidence or they do not pose any security 
threat. When it comes to these individuals the most 
important thing is to reduce the risk of violence and 
the increasing risk of radicalisation associated with 
them, and to promote their re-integration into society. 
The procedures must be open, they must strengthen 
the security of society and its inhabitants and reduce 
the risk of violence. The processes for managing those 
returning from combat zones will be established. 
(Responsibility: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of 
Justice, National Police Board, Office of the Prosecutor 
General).
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The implementation and results of the Action Plan for the Pre-
vention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism will be moni-
tored by a steering group which comprises the representatives 
of organisations that are of paramount importance to carrying 
out the measures. The steering group will annually approve 
the operating plan which describes the following year’s actions 
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and schedule in detail. Simultaneously, as the annual plan is 
approved, the annual thematic groups for the network which 
supports the cooperation group will also be accepted. The net-
works will comply with the focus areas of the annual operating 
plan and contribute to the expertise and participation required 
by its implementation.
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